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1Abstract
Crime and Uncertain Punishment in Transition Economies
We consider a continuum of agents in a transition country where the transfer
of property rights has occurred. The transition is in progress and the nature of the
government￿ s future policies is unknown to the agents. Agents believe that the present
government can evolve into one of two types: a traditional democratic government
that supplies law enforcement and infrastructure leading to positive ￿rm growth, or a
corrupt government that may or may not provide law enforcement, does not provide a
climate for ￿rm growth, and may be con￿scatory. Each agent owns one ￿rm, and we
de￿ne an illegal action (crime) as the diversion of funds from this ￿rm into the agent￿ s
pocket. Each agent decides how much to steal, understanding that the amount he
steals, and the government that will be in place, will a⁄ect the taxes he pays. Agents
further believe that the objective that each possible government wishes to achieve
depends on, or is limited by, the taxes it collects. Since both the agents￿decisions
and the tax revenue depend on the probability of each government type coming into
existence, we endogenize the calculation of this probability. Using it, we determine
the percentage of agents who steal, and investigate the relationship between the level
of crime and uncertain political structure.
JEL Classi￿cations: K42, P14, P26
Key Words: Crime, rule of law, transition, economies in transition, law enforce-
ment, political uncertainty, corruption, punishment
21. Introduction
Between 1990 and 2008, 37 incumbents were replaced in a total of 47 elections in 8
Central Eastern European countries.1 These electoral changes often resulted in gov-
ernments pursuing di⁄erent social and economic policies than their predecessors. Ev-
idence that economic policy changes have an impact on business decision makers can
be found in the BEEPS II data base. Turning to the broader group of 26 economies
in transition covered in this study, hundreds of respondents from each of these coun-
tries were asked many questions, including the following: How great an obstacle to
the operation and growth of your business is economic policy uncertainty? In 22 of
those countries, more than 50 per cent of the respondents stated that economic policy
uncertainty was either a moderate or a major obstacle to the operation and growth
of their business.2 How would an economic agent within one of these economies in
transition have dealt with the economic policy uncertainty? Would this uncertainty
have induced acts by these agents that would have undermined or impeded the devel-
opment of stable market-oriented democracies? In this paper, we attempt to answer
these questions by investigating the degree to which uncertainty concerning govern-
mental policy induces criminal acts on the part of agents in economies in transition.
In our model we explore the resulting level of crime and how this level changes with
agents￿uncertainty concerning government policy.
We consider a continuum of agents in a country in an early stage of transition from
a planned to a market economy and suppose the transfer of property rights, once held
by the state, has already occurred. However, the transition is still in progress, and
1See Kornai (2006) for a list of governmental turnovers in these countries between 1990 and
2004. He found 30 such instances. Using the same methodology and countries and extending
the time period to 2008, we found 37 instances in which incumbents were replaced. The current
￿nancial/economic crisis is bound to increase that number.
2See BEEPS II Interactive Dataset, EBRD￿ World Bank, 2002. The question can be found under
the heading Governance and Anti-Corruption. We excluded Turkey from the panel of countries,
leaving the 26 economies in transition.
3the nature of the government￿ s future policies is unknown to the agents. In particu-
lar, we assume that the agents believe that, due to a variety of reasons, the present
government may become either a traditional democratic government or a corrupt
government. We let each agent own one ￿rm, and de￿ne an illegal action (crime) as
the diversion of funds from this ￿rm into the agent￿ s pocket.3 We assume that each
agent has all the information needed to characterize the two possible forms that the
government may become when deciding how much to steal from his ￿rm. Each agent
must furthermore know the probability that the government will be democratic or
corrupt in order to complete the decision of how much to steal. With this probability,
individual decisions are made and collectively a level of crime results. We endogenize
this probability as follows. For each possible form of government that each agent con-
siders, he understands that di⁄erent levels of crime will produce di⁄erent amounts of
tax revenue. Thus, tax revenue that the agents believe the government would collect
depends on the probability of each form of government occurring. The interaction
between tax revenue and agents￿decisions determines the probability that the govern-
ment will become democratic and the level of crime induced. We then investigate how
the level of crime would change as the policies of both the democratic and corrupt
governments change.
In the context of the literature on the rule of law in transition economies, almost
all of the studies relating the form of government to the decision of an agent to
steal utilize a common approach: A particular type of government is assumed and
each agent optimizes his choice knowing this governmental form. Then another type
of government is postulated by the modeler, and the agent once again optimizes. A
comparison of the agents￿decisions are then analyzed. In these studies, no assumption
is made that the agent himself is aware of the various forms that the government
3We use crime for thefts perpetrated by agents, reserving the word corruption for certain acts of
government.
4might take. Examples of such studies include Polishchuk and Savvateev (2004), Sonin
(2003), and Katz and Owen (2009). Other studies that assume the impact of a speci￿c
form of government are Grossman (1995) and Alexeev, Janeba and Osborne (2004).
They both consider "ma￿as" that are independent of the government and compete
with the state for entrepreneurial rents in a setting where the form of the government
is ￿xed and known to the agents. The same is true of Dixit (2004), which suggests
a principal-agent model to capture the intent of a government to induce e¢ ciency
in society. An exception to this approach is o⁄ered in Ho⁄ and Stiglitz (2004),
which allows agents to face the uncertainty of two forms of government. There,
the endogenization of the probability of occurrence of these governments is based on
a consistency requirement among the agents, and not on the awareness of agents of
the types of governments that might ensue. This approach leads to multiple solutions
for the level of crime, making comparative statics awkward.
We contribute to the literature on the rule of law in transition in several ways.
First, by allowing the agents to consider the uncertain future form of the government
while also allowing them to presume that the government￿ s form will depend on tax
revenue, we are able to endogenize the probability of the government becoming one
form or the other. Our endogenization takes into account the agents￿perceptions
of the impact of their decisions on the form of government, as well as the agents￿
perceptions of the reaction of the government to the agents￿decisions. Second, as
a result of our method of endogenizing the probability of the government￿ s form, a
unique solution, that is, a unique level of crime, is induced. By determining the level of
crime, we establish a connection between perceived corruption in government and the
level of crime of the agents. Third, as the solution is unique, we are able to consider
the change in the level of crime induced by changes in parameters de￿ning each of
the government types. In addition to adding to this literature, we also contribute
to the literature on the role of institutions in transition (for example, Djankov and
5Murrell (2002), McMillan (2002) and Bevan and Estrin (2004)), and to that stressing,
more generally, that di⁄erent economic outcomes are to be expected from di⁄erent
institutional arrangements (for example, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) and Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002, 2003)). Our work shows that considering di⁄erent
institutional arrangements without allowing agents to be themselves aware of these
di⁄erent possibilities may cause some important implications to be missed.
We present our model in Section 2, deriving its properties and investigating some
comparative statics. In Section 3, some further implications of the model are investi-
gated through examples. Section 4 contains a discussion of our results and concluding
remarks.
2. The Model
We consider a transition economy with a government and a continuum of risk neu-
tral, von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility maximizing agents. We assume each
agent has already acquired property rights over a ￿rm, whose value at the outset is
normalized to one. The agent￿ s problem is to decide whether to steal from his ￿rm,
that is, what proportion ￿; ￿ 2 [0;1]; of the ￿rm￿ s value to divert to himself. Should
the agent elect to steal ￿; he incurs expenses c￿2
2 : Agents di⁄er only by the parame-
ter c: We assume that the continuum of agents is characterized by the continuous
distribution H(c); where H(c) is strictly increasing on c 2 [0;1] with density h(c):
The mean of this distribution is denoted by c: The agent￿ s decision concerning how
law abiding to be is made independently by each agent. All agents share the same
information except for the individual c value, which is known only privately.
The di¢ culty for the agents in deciding how much to steal hinges on the fact that
the agents do not know the form the government will take, and consequently do not
know the economic and punitive impacts of their choices. We limit the government￿ s
6form to one of two possibilities: a traditional democratic government that supplies
law enforcement, as well as infrastructure, leading to positive ￿rm growth (G1), or
alternatively, a corrupt government about which the agents are uncertain as to the
degree of law enforcement, as well as the degree of con￿scatory behavior, and in which
￿rms do not grow (G2).
The characterizations of the two possible government forms are assumed to be
known to each agent, and are summarized as follows.
G1: 1. G1 strictly enforces the rule of law and supplies a transparent ￿scal policy.
2. Honest agents are taxed at the rate t 2 [0;1]:
3. Infrastructure is improved at the rate r > 0:
4. All thieves are caught.
5. Stolen funds are taxed at the punitive rate (t+ ￿) 2 [0;1]:
G2: 1. G2 does not strictly enforce the rule of law and its ￿scal policy is uncertain.
2. Honest agents are taxed at the rate t 2 [0;1]:
3. Infrastructure is not improved, i.e., r = 0:
4. Thieves are caught with probability ￿ 2 [0;1]:
5a. If caught, the entire ￿rm of the thief is taxed at the rate b 2 [0;1]:
5b. If not caught, the thief keeps the stolen funds and the part of the ￿rm
remaining is taxed at the rate of t with probability p and at the rate t + ￿;
(t + ￿) 2 [0;1]; with probability (1 ￿ p):
In order for each agent to decide how much of his ￿rm to appropriate, he must
know the probability of the government becoming G1 or G2. We let ￿; ￿ 2 [0;1]; be
the probability that the government form will be G1.
We now establish the level of crime in the society that results from the agents￿
uncertainty regarding the government￿ s form assuming ￿ is known. We begin by
deriving the optimal decision for each agent under this assumption. Referring to a
particular agent by his cost parameter c; agent c￿ s decision can be summarized by the
7decision tree in Figure 2.1. The end-branch values are given by A = (1 ￿ t)(1 + r) ￿
￿￿(1+r)￿ c￿2
2 ; B = 1￿b￿ c￿2
2 ; C = ￿+(1￿￿)(1￿t)￿ c￿2
2 ; D = ￿+(1￿￿)(1￿t￿￿)￿ c￿2
2 :
Figure 2.1: Decision Tree
Our ￿rst proposition establishes ￿c(￿); the optimal proportion of the ￿rm that
agent c chooses to appropriate given the value of ￿. We de￿ne v(￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)t ￿
￿[(1 ￿ ￿)t + (1 + r)￿]; where t = t + (1 ￿ p)￿ is the expected tax rate under G2.
Proposition 1. Given ￿; agent c maximizes his expected utility by choosing to ap-
propriate ￿c(￿) percent of his ￿rm, where
￿c(￿) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
1 if v(￿) ￿ c
v(￿)
c if 0 < v(￿) < c
0 if v(￿) ￿ 0
:
Proof. See Appendix.
8From P1, it follows that all agents would choose to be honest if v(￿) ￿ 0: Ex-
amining v(￿); we see that this condition would hold if ￿￿(1 + r) were larger than
(1￿￿)(1￿￿)t. This inequality would occur if ￿; ￿ or r were large or if ￿ were large.
Thus, if agents believe the probability of G1 occurring is large, or perceive G1 as
guaranteeing a heavy penalty for breaking the law, or as producing a good environ-
ment, an honest society would follow. It would also follow if, in G2, there were a
high probability of catching thieves. Conversely, if ￿ were small, some level of crime
would result. The condition that v(￿) > 0 would hold if ￿￿(1 + r) were less than
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)t; that is, if agents expected the economy of G1 to grow moderately,
or expected the punitive tax rate to be not too large. Since (1 ￿ ￿)t ￿ 1; it follows
that v(￿) ￿ 1: So, unless both ￿ = 0 and t = 1; when v(￿) > 0 there will be c
values below v(￿) and the corresponding agents represent the proportion of agents
who steal heavily from their ￿rms. Furthermore, there will be c values greater than
v(￿) and the agents corresponding to these c values represent the proportion that
steal moderately from their ￿rms. In any event, when v(￿) > 0; all agents will steal
to varying degrees.
Given the value of ￿; we de￿ne the level of crime, K(￿ j ￿); as the proportion
of agents who steal at least ￿ percent of their ￿rms. Recall that c has distribution
function H(c):
Proposition 2. Given ￿ and 0 < ￿ ￿ 1; then
K(￿ j ￿) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 if v(￿) ￿ 0
H(
v(￿)
￿ ) if 0 < v(￿) < ￿
1 if v(￿) ￿ ￿
:
Proof. See Appendix.
Since K(￿ j ￿) depends on ￿ through the function v(￿); we can write it as K(v(￿) j
￿): Thus, through the function v(￿); the value of ￿ has an impact on individual
appropriation as well as on the level of crime in society. This, in turn, has an impact
9on the tax revenue collected by the government. We assume that agents believe that
the form that the government will take depends on the tax revenue that that form
produces. We use this assumption to endogenize the value of ￿:
In thinking about the tax revenue that would be produced by the alternative
forms of government, we assume that agents believe that the government evaluates
tax revenue based on the average agent (that is, the average value of c), whom we
denoted by c: Given ￿; we can then de￿ne the tax revenue that the agents￿perceive
that G1 would receive when the average agent is c as R(G1 j ￿;c): Similarly, given
￿; we de￿ne the tax revenue that the agents￿perceive that G2 would receive when
the average agent is c as R(G2 j ￿;c): We let f(￿) =
R(G1j￿;c)
R(G1j￿;c)+R(G2j￿;c) represent the
proportion of revenue the agents￿perceive as going to G1 corresponding to the average
agent c: We now assume that the agents believe that the higher the possible revenues
going to one type of government, the higher the likelihood that that government
will come into existence. Speci￿cally, we assume that agents will choose ￿ to satisfy
￿ = f(￿): We next evaluate f(￿); show that the equation ￿ = f(￿) has a unique
solution ￿￿; and examine some of the properties of ￿￿:
Proposition 3. f(￿) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
(1+r)(t+￿)








c )t if ￿0 < ￿ < ￿1
(1+r)t
(1+r)t+￿b+(1￿￿)t if ￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1
where ￿0 = max[0;
(1￿￿)t￿c




We denote the constant value of f(￿) when 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 as f(￿0): Similarly, the
constant value of f(￿) when ￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 is denoted by f(￿1):
Examination of the v(￿) function shows that v(￿0) = c so that for 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0;
v(￿) ￿ c and, from P1, for the average agent ￿￿
c = 1: Thus, agents believe that from
the government￿ s perspective, tax revenue is constant in the interval 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 at
10this highest level of crime. Similarly, since v(￿1) = 0 for ￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1; v(￿) ￿ 0 and
therefore ￿￿
c = 0: Again by P1, no crime will occur, and for all ￿ in this interval taxes
remain the same.
Proposition 4. ￿ = f(￿) has a unique solution ￿￿ 2 [0;1]:
Proof. See Appendix.
Having established the unique ￿￿ allows us to evaluate the optimal appropriation
of agent c as ￿c(￿￿): For convenience, we denote this as ￿￿
c: Similarly, the crime
level resulting from the optimal choices of the agents is denoted by K(v￿ j ￿) where
v￿ = v(￿￿):
We next investigate the relationships among ￿￿; ￿￿
c; and the tax revenue. Since ￿￿
c
is determined by v￿(see P1), we write the next proposition in terms of v￿: This focus
on v￿ is useful below when we consider the crime level.
Proposition 5. a. Any one of the following three inequalities implies the other two:
￿0 ￿ f(￿0); 0 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿0; v￿ ￿ c:
b. Any one of the following three inequalities implies the other two:
￿1 > f(￿1) and ￿0 < f(￿0); ￿0 < ￿￿ < ￿1; 0 < v￿ < c:
c. Any one of the following three inequalities implies the other two:
￿1 ￿ f(￿1); ￿1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 1; v￿ ￿ 0:
Proof. See Appendix.
P5 establishes the importance of the values ￿0 and ￿1 in locating ￿￿: Furthermore
it establishes the location of ￿￿ and the size of v￿ compared to c: Recalling P1, we see
that the size of v￿ relative to c will have di⁄erent repercussions on di⁄erent agents.
This follows since agent c needs to know the relationship between v￿ and c, not c; in
order to determine ￿￿
c: These comments lead to the next proposition.
11Proposition 6. a. If ￿1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 1; then all agents choose to be honest.
b. If 0 ￿ ￿￿ < ￿1; then all agents steal from their ￿rms and the proportion that
steals more than ￿ depends on c.
Proof. See Appendix.
We now shift our attention to the crime level K(v￿ j ￿): Since this function depends
on ￿￿ through v￿; we next show how v￿ is explicitly determined.
Proposition 7. Let c ￿ ￿:
a. If ￿0 ￿ f(￿0); then v￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)t ￿ f(￿0)[(1 ￿ ￿)t + (1 + r)￿] and K(v￿ j ￿) =
H(v￿
￿ ):
b. If ￿1 ￿ f(￿1); then v￿ = (1￿￿)t￿f(￿1)[(1￿￿)t+(1+r)￿] and K(v￿ j ￿) = 0:
c. If neither condition of parts a and b holds, then v￿ is the unique solution in
the unit interval of the function g2v2 ￿ g1v + g0 = 0 where g2 = (1 ￿ ￿)t ￿ (1 + r)￿;
g1 = (1+r)ct+c[￿b+(1￿￿)t]+(1￿￿)2t
2 +￿
2(1+r)2; and g0 = c(1￿￿)t[￿b+(1￿
￿)t] ￿ c￿t(1 + r)2 and K(v￿ j ￿) = H(v￿
￿ ):
Proof. See Appendix.
Since v￿ depends on the parameters that describe the perceived behavior of G1 and
G2, we next investigate how K(v￿ j ￿) changes as speci￿c parameters change. The
governmental parameters are ￿; r; b; ￿ and t: When focusing on a speci￿c parameter
￿; we write K(v￿ j ￿) as K(￿ j ￿): Since a change in c enters the model in a di⁄erent
way by altering the distribution H(c); it will be handled separately by an example
below.
Before proceeding, we note the following. When case b of P7 holds, K(￿ j ￿) is
constant. Thus, in￿nitesimal changes in any parameter ￿ will not change K(￿ j ￿):
The remaining cases, a and c, need closer scrutiny. In case c, K(￿ j ￿) = H(v￿
￿ ) is a





@￿ : Thus, the sign of
@K(￿j￿)
@￿ is the same as that of @v￿
@￿ : We address
this case next.
Proposition 8. Let 0 < v￿ < ￿ ￿ c: Then the sign of @v￿
@￿ is the same as the sign of
g2￿v￿2 ￿ g1￿v￿ + g0￿ where gi￿; i = 0;1;2; are the partial derivatives with respect to ￿
given in Proposition 7.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 9. Let 0 < v￿ < ￿ ￿ c. Then
a. K(￿ j ￿) decreases as ￿ = r or ￿ increases.
b. K(￿ j ￿) increases as ￿ = b or t increases.
c. If (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ c
t[1 ￿ b￿t
t ]; K(￿ j ￿) decreases as ￿ = ￿ increases.
Proof. See Appendix.
The case when v￿ ￿ c (P7a), produces similar results as in P9. This can be seen
by directly di⁄erentiating the v￿ function given in part a with respect to the various
parameters.
It is not surprising that the promise of an improvement in G1￿ s economy, i.e., an
increase in r; would cause more agents to wish to take advantage of this opportunity.
But, if these agents believe that G1 would be the government form, then any stealing
would be punished. Thus, to take advantage of the improved economic climate, the
amount of stealing would have to be reduced. Similarly, an increase in the punitive
rate ￿ would impose a heavier cost on every thief in G1 since each thief would be
caught. This, in turn, would dissuade some from stealing and reduce the overall level
of crime. Part b of P9 yields an often noted result that links crime to corruption.
If we interpret b as a bribe that the government extracts from criminals wishing to
avoid punishment, then an increase in this type of corruption would cause, rather
than deter, an increase in crime. Similarly, if G2 were to increase the tax rate t; an
13increase in the level of crime would occur. Part c of P9 shows the complexity of the
factors that could cause an increase or decrease in the level of crime. In particular, the
change in the level of crime due to a change in ￿ cannot be predicted without imposing
restrictions on other parameters. The interactions between these parameters, as well
as the non-linearities inherent in the model, prevent simple predictions from being
made. We illustrate this below by example. In P9 we assumed that 0 < v￿ < ￿ ￿ c:
However, the case where c < v￿ ￿ ￿ can be shown to yield similar results.
3. Examples
In order to illustrate some additional features of the model and the level of crime
associated with the parameters, we start with a baseline model of the two possible
forms that the agents believe the government might take. For this baseline model,
we compute the resulting level of crime. Afterwards, we alter some of the parameter
values of the baseline model to illustrate some of the comparative statics established
in our propositions. We also include additional results.
We assume that the distribution of agents is given by H(c) = c 2 [0;1]; implying
that c = :5:
3.1. Baseline model.
Assumptions about G1 and G2 are as follows.
G1: 1. G1 strictly enforces the rule of law and supplies a transparent ￿scal policy.
2. Honest agents are taxed at rate t = :3:
3. Infrastructure is improved at the rate r = :2:
4. All thieves are caught.
5. Stolen funds are taxed at the punitive rate (t+ ￿) = :5:
G2: 1. G2 does not strictly enforce the rule of law and its ￿scal policy is uncertain.
142. Honest agents are taxed at the rate t = :3:
3. Infrastructure is not improved, i.e., r = 0:
4. Thieves are caught with probability ￿ = :5:
5a. If caught, the entire ￿rm of the thief is taxed at the rate b = :6:
5b. If not caught, the thief keeps the stolen funds and the part of the ￿rm
remaining is taxed at the rate of t = :3 with probability p = :5 and at the
rate t + ￿ = :7 with probability :5; i.e., t = :5:
Using these values, it follows that ￿0 = 0 and ￿1 = :5102: From P5, f(￿1) = :3956
and ￿￿ 2 (0;￿1): Since, from P7, v￿ satis￿es g2v￿2 ￿ g1v￿ + g0 = 0; we can solve
this equation explicitly. This yields ￿￿ = :4182 and v￿ = :0451: Based on P7, the
proportions of agents stealing more than 15%, 25% and 50% of their ￿rms in this
benchmark case are K(:0451 j :15) = :30, K(:0451 j :25) = :18; and K(:0451 j :50) =
:09; respectively. When there are as many high cost as low cost agents, moderate
crime ￿ ourishes and there is a notable number of large crimes.
3.2. Comparative statics in the examples.
Turning to comparative statics, we note that increasing r; ￿; b or t results in an
unambiguous change in the proportion of agents who steal from their ￿rms as seen
in P9. On the other hand, the impact of a change in ￿ is more complicated. We now
illustrate part c of P9. We increase the value of ￿ from :5 to:6. We must check two
conditions to illustrate part c. First, we must check whether ￿0 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿1 for ￿ = :6;
and second, whether 1 ￿ :6 ￿ c
t[1 ￿ b￿t
t ]: The second condition is easily veri￿ed since
the right-hand-side of the inequality equals :8: To check the ￿rst condition, we must
resolve the problem for ￿ = :6: Re-solving, we have ￿￿ = :395; v￿ = :026; ￿0 = 0;
￿1 = :455 and f(￿1) = :39: The ￿rst condition is satis￿ed and we illustrate part c by
computing the levels of crime. It follows from v￿ = :026 that K(￿ j :15) = :17; K(￿ j
:25) = :10; and K(￿ j :50) = :05: As predicted by P9, each of these values is smaller
15than its counterpart in the benchmark case: K(￿ j :15) = :30, K(￿ j :25) = :18; and
K(￿ j :50) = :09:
Based on the remark before P8, c could not be included in P9 so we next present
an example that varies from the original illustration by changing the distribution of c:
Let H(c) = c2 for c 2 [0;1]: Thus, c = 2=3: Reworking the illustration (setting ￿ = :5
again), we have ￿￿ = :4144 and v￿ = :0469: Here, the proportions of agents stealing
more than 15%, 25% and 50% of their ￿rms are K(c j :15) = :10; K(c j :25) = :035;
and K(c j :50) = :009; respectively. Moderate crime is much lower and large crimes
have been substantially reduced compared with the benchmark case.
We consider one ￿nal variation of our basic illustration that was not handled by P9,
that is, the change in the basic tax rate t shared by both governments. Reworking
our illustration after setting t = :5; we have ￿￿ = :5046 and v￿ = :0523: Here,
the proportions of agents stealing more than 15%, 25% and 50% of their ￿rms are
K(t j :15) = :35; K(t j :25) = :21; and K(t j :50) = :10: Compared to the benchmark
case K(t j :15) = :30, K(t j :25) = :18; and K(t j :50) = :09; we see that the increase
in the basic tax rate by G1 causes the level of crime to rise.
4. Discussion and Conclusions
Our model was chosen to explore the impact of an evolving government on the level
of crime. Facing the uncertainty of the direction the government would take, agents
decided how much to steal from their ￿rms. In order to make these decisions, we
assumed that the agents in this society presumed that the government￿ s ultimate
form would be based on the level of tax revenue that that form would generate. Our
results were based on the agents beliefs, and did not depend on whether the actual
government had a criterion di⁄erent from that assumed by the agents. Since crime
would alter tax revenue, and the agents￿decisions to steal had to be made before
16the government￿ s form was know, the probability that the government would take
a particular form was determined endogenously. Having ￿xed the ultimate form of
the government to be one of two kinds, each with known structure to the agents,
we derived the ensuing level of crime. This established the connection between the
level of crime and the uncertain evolving form that the government could take. We
then considered the impact that changes in the characteristics of the two potential
governments forms would have on the level of crime. This development was based on
a number of assumptions that we now discuss.
Five key assumptions were made in our development: (1) that there were two
possible future forms of government, (2) that agents believed that the realized form of
government would be in￿ uenced by the taxes that that government would receive, (3)
that agents believed that each government would evaluate its potential tax revenues
based on an average agent, (4) the method of endogenizing ￿, and (5) that the
distribution of the agents￿costs of stealing, H(c); would be known to the government,
as least in so far as it permitted the the government to calculate the average cost.
We comment on these in turn.
It is clearly a simpli￿cation to assume that only two forms of government can arise
and that each of the characteristics of these would be entirely known to the agents.
Dropping all or part of this assumption would lead to complexities that would add
to the degree of uncertainty that agents would face, thus exaggerating the results we
found. Assuming that the implied tax revenue is instrumental in the ensuing form
of government is a particularly strong assumption since it does not take into account
the political or personal motivations of those that might form the next government.
However, this simpli￿cation allowed us to carry through the analysis of our model.
The robustness of our result will depend on how far a￿eld our assumption is from
reality. We assumed that agents believed that each possible government would cal-
culate its future tax revenues based on those paid by the average agent (c), and we
17assumed that individual agents knew the behavior of the average agent. It is possible
that each potential government could be thought of as computing the actual total
tax revenues paid by all agents but it would be di¢ cult to assume that each agent
would have this information. Thus, again, this assumption was made for tractability
of the model. Given the previous assumption, it seemed reasonable to assume that
each agent would choose the probability that a speci￿c form of government would
come into being as a function of the anticipated tax revenues of that form of govern-
ment. Our assumption that ￿ is proportional to the anticipated tax revenue of G1
is a simpli￿cation of this requirement, but one that again allowed us to develop our
model. Assuming H(c) to be known is a surrogate for assuming knowledge about the
inclination toward crime of that society at the outset of the decision process, i.e., the
initial conditions of such a propensity. It is clear that di⁄erent countries would have
di⁄erent initial conditions and, in our model, the assumption enables agents to this
into account this measure of lawlessness before making their decisions. Implicit in
this is that, ceteris paribus, di⁄erent countries with di⁄erent initial conditions would
have di⁄erent levels of crime, a point that has been empirically noted many times.
While agents in western mixed market economies may be uncertain about a future
government￿ s economic and/or social policies, we believe that this uncertainty is par-
ticularly acute in transition economies. It is in the latter that governments changed
and continue to change without a ￿rm grounding in established legal or judiciary
traditions, without codes of regulation and without a consensus against self-dealing
transactions. In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of communism, a new rule
of law had to be established to replace the legal structures that were part of the dis-
credited states. Agents anticipating this development had to contend with a legacy of
government distrust. In this paper we investigated one consequence of this distrust.
185. Appendix
Proof of P1.
We ￿rst establish the expected utility of agent c if he steals ￿: From the text,
E(G1) = (1+r)(1￿t)￿￿￿(1+r)￿ c￿2
2 : Also, E(G2) = 1￿￿b￿(1￿￿)(1￿￿)t￿ c￿2
2 :
Finally, the expected utility of agent c is ￿E(G1) + (1 ￿ ￿)E(G2) which after some
collection of terms becomes ￿(1 ￿ t)(1 + r) + (1 ￿ ￿)[1 ￿ (￿b + (1 ￿ ￿)t)] + ￿[(1 ￿
￿)(1 ￿ ￿)t ￿ ￿￿(1 + r)] ￿ c￿2
2 : Maximizing this expression over ￿ for 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 yields
￿c(￿) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
1 for v(￿) ￿ c
v(￿)
c for 0 < v(￿) < c
0 for v(￿) ￿ 0
;
where v(￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)t ￿ ￿[(1 ￿ ￿)t + (1 + r)￿]:|
Proof of P2.
Assume ￿ is given. If v(￿) ￿ 0; from P1 no agent steals and thus K(￿ j ￿) = 0; If
0 < v(￿) < ￿; then agent c will steal at least ￿ if c ￿
v(￿)
￿ : Thus, from the de￿nition
of H(c); it follows that K(￿ j ￿) = H(
v(￿)
￿ ): Finally, if v(￿) ￿ ￿; then every value of
c will satisfy
v(￿)
c ￿ ￿ so K(￿ j ￿) = 1:|
Proof of P3.
It follows from the de￿nition of v(￿) that v(￿) ￿ c if 0 ￿ ￿ ￿
(1￿￿)t￿c
(1￿￿)t+(1+r)￿;
0 < v(￿) < c if
(1￿￿)t￿c
(1￿￿)t+(1+r)￿ < ￿ <
(1￿￿)t
(1￿￿)t+(1+r)￿; and v(￿) ￿ 0 if
(1￿￿)t
(1￿￿)t+(1+r)￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1:
Thus, for agent c; and using P1, we have
￿c(￿) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
1 if 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0
v(￿)
c if ￿0 < ￿ < ￿1
0 if ￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1
;
where ￿0 = max[0;
(1￿￿)t￿c
(1￿￿)t+(1+r)￿] and ￿1 =
(1￿￿)t
(1￿￿)t+(1+r)￿:
19The government￿ s expected revenue corresponds to the tax revenue that results
from the average agent￿ s optimum choice, i.e., ￿c(￿): Thus, R(G1 j ￿;c) = (1 +
r)(t + ￿c(￿)￿); i.e., the tax t on the ￿nal value of the ￿rm plus the additional tax on
the stolen part of the ￿rm. Also, R(G2 j ￿;c) = ￿b + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿c(￿))t; i.e., the
government gets the "bribe" with probability ￿ and, with the remaining probability






the value of ￿c(￿) from above yields the result. |
Proof of P4.
Examination of f(￿) in P3 shows that it is continuous and non-increasing for
0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1: Furthermore, by construction, 0 < f(￿) < 1: Thus, the function ￿ ￿ f(￿)
is a continuous, increasing function that is negative at ￿ = 0 and positive at ￿ = 1:
Thus, it crosses the axis at a unique value, ￿￿:|
Proof of P5.
We will prove part b only since the proofs of parts a and c are similar. Let
￿0 < f(￿0) and ￿1 > f(￿1): Since ￿ ￿ f(￿) is a continuous increasing function of
￿; it follows that ￿ ￿ f(￿) = 0 once in the interval (￿0;￿1); i.e., ￿0 < ￿￿ < ￿: Let
￿0 < ￿￿ < ￿: Then ￿ ￿ f(￿) has a root in (￿0;￿1) and since ￿ ￿ f(￿) is increasing,
it follows that ￿0 < f(￿0) and ￿1 > f(￿1): So ￿0 < f(￿0) and ￿1 > f(￿1) if and only
if ￿0 < ￿￿ < ￿: From the de￿nitions of v￿; ￿0; and ￿1; it follows that we can write
v￿￿c = d(￿0￿￿￿) and v￿ = d(￿1￿￿￿) where d = (1￿￿)t+(1+r)￿ > 0: Thus, v￿ < c
if and only if ￿￿ > ￿0 and v￿ > 0 if and only if ￿￿ < ￿1: Therefore, ￿0 < ￿￿ < ￿1 if
and only if 0 < v￿ < c:|
Proof of P6.
From P5, ￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 implies that v￿ ￿ 0: From P1 this implies that ￿￿
c = 0 for
all c so part a follows. Also, from P5, we have that for any ￿￿ 2 [0;￿1); v￿ > 0: From
P1, it follows that ￿￿
c > 0 for all c and part b follows:|
20Proof of P7.
a. If ￿0 ￿ f(￿0); then by P5, 0 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿0 and f(￿) = f(￿0) over this interval.
Therefore ￿￿ = f(￿0) and by de￿nition v￿ = (1￿￿)t￿f(￿0)[(1￿￿)t+(1+r)￿]: Also
by P5, in this interval v￿ ￿ c ￿ 0: Thus, K(v￿ j ￿) = H(v￿
￿ ):
b. If ￿1 ￿ f(￿1); then by P5, v￿ ￿ 0 and by P1, ￿￿
c = 0 for all c: Thus, K(v￿ j
￿) = 0:
c. If ￿1 > f(￿1) and ￿0 < f(￿0); then from P5, 0 ￿ v￿ < c: Thus, from P3 it





c t): Since v￿ = (1￿￿)t￿￿￿[(1￿
￿)t + (1 + r)￿]; ￿￿ can be written as
(1￿￿)t￿v￿
(1￿￿)t+(1+r)￿; making the previous equation a
function of v￿: Multiplying through by the denominator of the right-hand-side and
rearranging terms yields a quadratic equation in v￿; i.e., g2v￿2 ￿g1v￿ +g0; where the
functions gi; i = 0;1;2; are given in the proposition. Since ￿￿
c > 0 on this interval,
K(v￿ j ￿) = H(v￿
￿ ):|
Proof of P8.
Implicit di⁄erentiation of the polynomial of part c of P7 shows that v￿
￿ = @v￿
@￿ must
satisfy (g1 ￿ 2g2v￿)v￿
￿ = g2￿v￿2 ￿ g1￿v￿ + g0￿: It remains to show that g1 ￿ 2g2v￿ > 0:
Note
g1 ￿ 2g2v





￿[(1 ￿ ￿)t ￿ (1 + r)￿)]
￿ c(1 ￿ ￿)t ￿ v
￿(1 ￿ ￿)t + (1 ￿ ￿)t
2 ￿ v
￿(1 ￿ ￿)t
= (1 ￿ ￿)t[c ￿ v
￿ + t ￿ v
￿]:
It follows that g1 ￿ 2g2v￿ > 0 since v￿ < (1 ￿ ￿)t ￿ t and v￿ < c; thus the
proposition follows.|
Proof of P9.
Part a. Evaluating g2￿v￿2 ￿ g1￿v￿ + g0￿ for ￿ = r yields ￿￿v￿2 ￿ v￿[ct + 2￿
2(1 +
21r)] ￿ 2c￿t(1 + r) < 0: Similarly, evaluating this expression for ￿ = ￿ yields the same
sign.
Part b. When ￿ = b; the expression becomes v￿[c￿]+c(1￿￿)t￿ = c￿[(1￿￿)t￿v￿] >
0:
Now let ￿ = t: Evaluating g2￿v￿2 ￿g1￿v￿+g0￿ for ￿ = t; yields v￿2(1￿￿)￿v￿[c(1￿
￿) + 2(1 ￿ ￿)2t] + c(1 ￿ ￿)[￿b + (1 ￿ ￿)t] + c(1 ￿ ￿)2t
= (1 ￿ ￿)fv￿(v￿ ￿ c) ￿ 2(1 ￿ ￿)t(v￿ ￿ c) + c￿bg
= (1 ￿ ￿)f(v￿ ￿ c)[v￿ ￿ 2(1 ￿ ￿)t] + c￿bg > 0 since v￿ < c and v￿ < 2(1 ￿ ￿)t:
Part c. Evaluating g2￿v￿2 ￿g1￿v￿ +g0￿ for ￿ = ￿ yields ￿tv￿2 ￿v￿[c(b￿t)￿2(1￿
￿)t
2] + c(b ￿ t)(1 ￿ ￿)t ￿ ct[￿b + (1 ￿ ￿)t]
= tv￿[(1￿￿)t￿v￿]+c(b￿t)[(1￿￿)t￿v￿]+(1￿￿)t
2v￿￿ct[￿b+(1￿￿)t]: Remembering
that v￿ = (1￿￿)t￿￿￿[(1￿￿)t+(1+r)￿] and the de￿nition of ￿1 given in P2, the sign
of the last expression is unchanged when we divide through by [(1￿￿)t+(1+r)￿] and
it becomes tv￿￿￿ + c(b ￿ t)￿￿ + [(1 ￿ ￿)t
2(￿1 ￿ ￿￿) ￿ ct￿1 ￿ ct￿b
(1￿￿)t+(1+r)￿]: Combining
terms we have t￿￿[v￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)t] + c(b ￿ t)￿￿ + [(1 ￿ ￿)t
2 ￿ ct]￿1 ￿ ct￿b
(1￿￿)t+(1+r)￿: This
expression is non-positive if c(b￿t)￿￿+[(1￿￿)t





The last inequality would hold if (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ c
t[1 ￿ b￿t
t ]:|
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